waanjai_2
Senior Member
Themenstarter
Nach all den Desinformationen, die man über das Petitionsrecht der Thais in den chronisch lügenden, engl.-sprachigen Zeitungen - und damit dann also auch hier - lesen mußte, eine selten klare Beschreibung durch einen Nation-Mitarbeiter.
http://www.geocities.com/changnoi2/petition.htm
Ob es ein Zufall ist, dass dieser Beitrag bei der Nation nicht zu finden ist? Sonst waren seine Beiträge immer alle auch dort zu finden.
Whose bell is it anyway?
24 august 2009
In the weeks leading up to the submission of the redshirts’ petition on behalf of Thaksin, some surprising things were said and written.
We were told repeatedly by political figures, academics, and media contributors that the petition was illegal and improper, that those signing it might be liable to prosecution for lese majeste or contempt of court (one general suggested the death penalty), and that the whole exercise was counter to law, tradition, convention, and proper “Thai” behaviour.
But Section 59 of the current constitution states: “A person shall have the right to present a petition and to be informed about the result of its consideration within the appropriate time.” And Section 187 states, “The King has the prerogative to grant a pardon.”
It does not matter what the criminal code says about the proper procedure for petitions on specific issues. The right to submit a petition is an absolute right governed by the constitution.
The 1997 constitution stated: “A person shall have the right to present a petition and to be informed of the result of its consideration within the appropriate time, as provided by law.” The final clause in this 1997 version did make it appear that this right was conditional on other laws. But the drafters of the 2007 constitution, appointed by the coup generals, removed this trailing clause for greater clarity. In the 2007 version, the right to present a petition is an absolute right, without qualification. And the royal prerogative is totally unconditional.
Could it be that most journalists and broadcasters, several permanent secretaries, the rectors of major universities, almost the entire academic staff of Chulalongkorn University, and the prime minister are unaware of these provisions in the constitution? Probably not.
Could it be that several of those who claimed the Thaksin petition is illegal, immoral, improper, distasteful, and devious have forgotten that they signed a petition three years ago calling on the monarch to remove Thaksin from office under Section 7 of the constitution? Probably not. Yet the distinguished political scientist who led the delegation that hand-delivered that petition to the palace on 5 March 2006 has been among those decrying the Thaksin petition.
Make no mistake. Chang Noi thinks that Thaksin does not deserve a pardon, and indeed should be punished for his major crimes. But the opposition to the petition raised issues of principle, history, and practical politics.
More interestingly, many of those who felt moved to publicly oppose the Thaksin petition are precisely those people who regularly point to the right of petition as one proof that Thailand is a better democracy as a result of being a democracy with a constitutional monarchy. The fundamental text for this argument is Inscription One, claimed to have been authored by King Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai in the thirteenth century. The Inscription lists several claims for Ramkhamhaeng’s enlightened rule, including: “He has hung a bell in the opening of the gate over there; if any commoner in the land has a grievance which sickens his belly and gripes his heart, and which he wants to make known to his ruler and lord, it is easy; he goes and strikes the bell which the King has hung there. King Ramkhamhaeng, the ruler of the kingdom, hears the call; he goes and questions the man, examines the case, and decides in justly for him. So the people of this city of Sukhothai praise him.”
For over 60 years, this excerpt from the inscription has been repeatedly quoted to support the idea that there has been a unique “Thai system of government” down through the ages. In 1946, Prince Dhani Nivat argued that the bell proved that the Thai monarch was always “accessible to the people,” and that this method of calling for redress “survived with slight modifications all through the centuries down to the change of regime in 1932.” A few years later, Kukrit Pramoj cited the bell as central to his argument that “this Thai system of government is good,” and has always been good. He repeated the quotation time and again through his long career as politician and publicist, eventually claiming the bell and the right of petition were proof that liberalism, democracy, and monarchy were bound together in Thai tradition for 700 years. Countless others have followed suit in using Ramkhamhaeng’s bell as symbol and proof of the specialness and value of this tradition.
What is fascinating is that many of the people opposing the Thaksin petition were exactly the sort of people who normally love to cite the example of the bell. Of course, in opposing the petition, they tried to add some conditional arguments. They said that in this case the bell was being used in the wrong way; the bell was being used with bad intentions; the bell was being used illegally. They seem to have forgotten that the key point of the original line in the inscription is that the bell is totally without conditions: “if any commoner in the land has a grievance … he goes and strikes the bell.” They seem to have forgotten that it was the simplicity and universality of the bell that made it so attractive to Prince Dhani, Kukrit, and others of similar mind as proof that “this Thai system of government is good.”
Over the last two years, we have got used to seeing the pillars of Thai democracy undermined for short-term reasons. But it is still surprising to see one of the foundations of the conservative tradition treated in the same way.
But the most important point concerns the political consequences of this outcry against the petition in the context of today’s delicate political tensions. For supporters of Thaksin who remember the simple old argument of the bell and cannot follow the subtle conditionalities introduced by political scientists, leader writers, university rectors, and permanent secretaries, will probably assume that what they are really being told is: the bell is for us not for you.
http://www.geocities.com/changnoi2/petition.htm
Ob es ein Zufall ist, dass dieser Beitrag bei der Nation nicht zu finden ist? Sonst waren seine Beiträge immer alle auch dort zu finden.
Whose bell is it anyway?
24 august 2009
In the weeks leading up to the submission of the redshirts’ petition on behalf of Thaksin, some surprising things were said and written.
We were told repeatedly by political figures, academics, and media contributors that the petition was illegal and improper, that those signing it might be liable to prosecution for lese majeste or contempt of court (one general suggested the death penalty), and that the whole exercise was counter to law, tradition, convention, and proper “Thai” behaviour.
But Section 59 of the current constitution states: “A person shall have the right to present a petition and to be informed about the result of its consideration within the appropriate time.” And Section 187 states, “The King has the prerogative to grant a pardon.”
It does not matter what the criminal code says about the proper procedure for petitions on specific issues. The right to submit a petition is an absolute right governed by the constitution.
The 1997 constitution stated: “A person shall have the right to present a petition and to be informed of the result of its consideration within the appropriate time, as provided by law.” The final clause in this 1997 version did make it appear that this right was conditional on other laws. But the drafters of the 2007 constitution, appointed by the coup generals, removed this trailing clause for greater clarity. In the 2007 version, the right to present a petition is an absolute right, without qualification. And the royal prerogative is totally unconditional.
Could it be that most journalists and broadcasters, several permanent secretaries, the rectors of major universities, almost the entire academic staff of Chulalongkorn University, and the prime minister are unaware of these provisions in the constitution? Probably not.
Could it be that several of those who claimed the Thaksin petition is illegal, immoral, improper, distasteful, and devious have forgotten that they signed a petition three years ago calling on the monarch to remove Thaksin from office under Section 7 of the constitution? Probably not. Yet the distinguished political scientist who led the delegation that hand-delivered that petition to the palace on 5 March 2006 has been among those decrying the Thaksin petition.
Make no mistake. Chang Noi thinks that Thaksin does not deserve a pardon, and indeed should be punished for his major crimes. But the opposition to the petition raised issues of principle, history, and practical politics.
More interestingly, many of those who felt moved to publicly oppose the Thaksin petition are precisely those people who regularly point to the right of petition as one proof that Thailand is a better democracy as a result of being a democracy with a constitutional monarchy. The fundamental text for this argument is Inscription One, claimed to have been authored by King Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai in the thirteenth century. The Inscription lists several claims for Ramkhamhaeng’s enlightened rule, including: “He has hung a bell in the opening of the gate over there; if any commoner in the land has a grievance which sickens his belly and gripes his heart, and which he wants to make known to his ruler and lord, it is easy; he goes and strikes the bell which the King has hung there. King Ramkhamhaeng, the ruler of the kingdom, hears the call; he goes and questions the man, examines the case, and decides in justly for him. So the people of this city of Sukhothai praise him.”
For over 60 years, this excerpt from the inscription has been repeatedly quoted to support the idea that there has been a unique “Thai system of government” down through the ages. In 1946, Prince Dhani Nivat argued that the bell proved that the Thai monarch was always “accessible to the people,” and that this method of calling for redress “survived with slight modifications all through the centuries down to the change of regime in 1932.” A few years later, Kukrit Pramoj cited the bell as central to his argument that “this Thai system of government is good,” and has always been good. He repeated the quotation time and again through his long career as politician and publicist, eventually claiming the bell and the right of petition were proof that liberalism, democracy, and monarchy were bound together in Thai tradition for 700 years. Countless others have followed suit in using Ramkhamhaeng’s bell as symbol and proof of the specialness and value of this tradition.
What is fascinating is that many of the people opposing the Thaksin petition were exactly the sort of people who normally love to cite the example of the bell. Of course, in opposing the petition, they tried to add some conditional arguments. They said that in this case the bell was being used in the wrong way; the bell was being used with bad intentions; the bell was being used illegally. They seem to have forgotten that the key point of the original line in the inscription is that the bell is totally without conditions: “if any commoner in the land has a grievance … he goes and strikes the bell.” They seem to have forgotten that it was the simplicity and universality of the bell that made it so attractive to Prince Dhani, Kukrit, and others of similar mind as proof that “this Thai system of government is good.”
Over the last two years, we have got used to seeing the pillars of Thai democracy undermined for short-term reasons. But it is still surprising to see one of the foundations of the conservative tradition treated in the same way.
But the most important point concerns the political consequences of this outcry against the petition in the context of today’s delicate political tensions. For supporters of Thaksin who remember the simple old argument of the bell and cannot follow the subtle conditionalities introduced by political scientists, leader writers, university rectors, and permanent secretaries, will probably assume that what they are really being told is: the bell is for us not for you.
